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Abstract 
 
The Euro-Med Agreement between Tunisia and the European Union resulted in free 
bilateral trade for industrial products from January 1
st
, 2008.  The stepwise dismantling of 
industrial tariff barriers vis-à-vis Tunisia’s main trading partner without encountering 
major disruptions in the domestic market is a significant achievement.  But now a new 
challenge looms.  In order to achieve the economic growth rates of 6.1 percent that the 
country is aspiring to in its 11
th
 Development Plan, policy makers and private sector 
operators will have to shift from a stance that is focused on defending domestic interests 
against import competition to an offensive strategy that enables Tunisian exporters to 
take part and benefit from dynamically evolving global markets. Indeed, strengthening 
Tunisia’s export performance is a major challenge and requires attention to the incentives 
that actual and potential exporters face, the efficiency of service providers in the 
economy, and the effectiveness of trade support institutions that help private sector firms 
to discover and exploit international market opportunities.   
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1. TOWARDS AN OFFENSIVE TRADE STRATEGY 
Tunisia’s trade policy is on the verge of a fundamental paradigm shift. After 
independence, the country pursued a policy of import substitution that shielded domestic 
producers from international markets behind high trade barriers.  In 1972, the government 
started to attenuate the strong anti-export bias of the restrictive import regime by creating 
an ―off-shore‖ regime to attract foreign direct investment for export-oriented production, 
and during the following two decades preferential trade agreements were negotiated with 
countries within the Mena region and beyond in order to integrate with partners on a 
selective basis.  The Euro-Med Agreement with the European Union is arguably the most 
important of the country’s preferential trading arrangements, resulting in free bilateral 
trade for industrial products by January 1
st
, 2008.  Indeed, the stepwise dismantling of 
industrial tariff barriers vis-à-vis Tunisia’s main trading partner without encountering 
major disruptions in the domestic market is a significant achievement.  But now a new 
challenge looms.  In order to achieve the economic growth rates of 6.1 percent that the 
country is aspiring to in its 11
th
 Development Plan, policy makers and private sector 
operators will have to shift from a stance that is focused on defending domestic interests 
against import competition to an offensive strategy that enables Tunisian exporters to 
take part and benefit from dynamically evolving global markets. 
Over the past 25 years, many developing countries have managed to increase the 
well-being of their population and reduced the incidence of poverty by taking 
advantage of opportunities in international markets.  Some have benefitted from the 
discovery, exploitation, and (recent) price surge for fuel and commodities, while others 
have gained strongly following structural transformations in the transition from centrally 
planned to market-based economies.  Yet, even among the non-fuel exporting, non-
transition countries, there is a sizeable number of economies that have achieved sustained 
long-term growth.  Indeed, sixteen of these countries managed to more than triple their 
GDP between 1980 and 2005, which corresponds to an average annual growth rate of 
more than 4.5 percent. 
1
  
The success of the High Performers has been based on an export-oriented strategy.  
Such an outward-looking paradign seems appropriate for most developing countries, 
given the generally limited size of the domestic market that does not make it possible to 
take advantage of benefits of economies of scale and competition-driven productivity 
gains.  Jones and Olken (2005) find that growth take-offs are strongly associated with a 
large and steady expansion of international trade. In fact, the sixteen High Performers 
pursued a strategy of export-led growth and increased their share of world non-fuel 
merchandise exports and world services exports substantially over the past two decades 
(Figure 1a).   
                                                 
1
. The 16 High Performers are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and Uganda.  Five of these 
countries (Chile, Malaysia, Mauritius, Thailand, and Sri Lanka) can be seen as direct middle-income 
comparators for Tunisia. 
 4 
 
Figure 1:  Tunisia’s share of world exports has been stagnant 
 a) Share in world non-oil goods exports  b) Share in world services exports 
(1985 = 100)        (1985 = 100) 
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Source: World Bank staff based on IMF World Economic Outlook databases.  
In contrast, Tunisia’s export performance has been mixed.  The country’s share in 
world services exports has declined over the past two decades (Figure 1b), and the loss of 
market share has accelerated since the beginning the new Millenium.  In contract, Tunisia 
has maintained its share in world goods markets since the mid-1990s, the apparel sector 
has resisted well to increasing world market competition following the phase-out of the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement, and non-tradional export sectors, such as car parts and 
electronics, have been gaining traction. Moreover, after the push towards export 
diversification seemed to have petered out during the 1990s, the structure of exports has 
gradually been becoming more diverse over the past decade, reflecting the shift into new 
production activities (Figure 2a). Also, Tunisia exploits an increasing, yet still relatively 
small fraction of the potential markets for the country’s export products (Figure 2b).. 
Brenton and Newfarmer (2007) derive an index of export market penetration (IEMP) that 
measures the extent to which a country is actually exploiting its geographical market 
opportunities from the existing set of export products.  For the given range of products 
that a country exports, the IEMP will be higher for countries that reach a large proportion 
of the number of international markets that import those products. Countries that only 
export to a small number of the overseas markets that import the products that the 
country exports will have a low value of the index.   
The uneven and overall unspectacular export performance has not resulted from 
external factors that temporarily reduce competitiveness.  Instead, the comparison 
with the group of high performers, many of which have a similar exposure to terms of 
trade and commodity price effects as Tunisia, suggests a gap in the capacity to take 
advantage of international market opportunities.  Addressing these shortcomings in 
Tunisia’s export performance is a major challenge and requires attention to the incentives 
that actual and potential exporters face, the efficiency of service providers in the 
economy, and the effectiveness of trade support institutions that help private sector firms 
to discover and exploit international market opportunities.  These three aspects of export 
competitiveness and economic integration will be discussed in turn. 
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Figure 2:  Tunisia’s goods exports remain concentrated 
 a) Concentration by product   b) Concentration by export market 
     (Herfindahl index *)     (Index of export market penetration **) 
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Note: *) higher means more concentrated.  
**)  the index is the ratio of all product/market export relationships a country has, divided by the potential 
number of trade relationships if the country was to export its products to all countries that import these 
products (higher means broader market penetration).   
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Trade Statistics, and Brenton and Newfarmer (2007).  
 
 
2. THE INCENTIVE REGIME NEEDS TO ALLOW FOR FLEXIBLE ADJUSTMENT 
Improving export performance will require movement of capital and labor 
resources from less productive firms to more productive exporting companies.  Also, 
resource mobility will facilitate the export of higher quality products, which will tend to 
have a somewhat different input mix than traditional or lower quality products. Finally, 
resources need to be flexible enough to allow the emergence of new export activities, 
including in non-traditional services.  Hence, a key challenge for policy makers is to 
ensure that land, labor, capital and technology are moving to (a) sectors in which the 
country has a long-term capacity to compete and (b) to the most productive firms within 
sectors. This necessitates a clear understanding of how the business environment and 
trade and tax policies interact to affect investment, output and trade decisions. 
The Tunisian authorities have played a useful role in helping the private sector cope 
with increased import competition from European supplier. The government has 
accompanied the opening of the industrial sector with the implementation of a ―mise-à-niveau‖ 
upgrading program, aimed at enhancing the organizational, technological, and marketing 
capabilities of firms that were being gradually exposed to competition from EU-based 
producers. In parallel, efforts were made to promote trade development through electronic 
documentation processing (Tunisia Trade Net), as well as streamlined technical controls, 
improved customs procedures, and increased access to information on standards and technical 
regulations.  
Tunisia has also been relatively successful in creating an environment that is 
attractive for export-oriented foreign investors.  Inflows of FDI have continued to be 
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strong, and the privatization receipts from the sale of Tunisie Telecom pushed the FDI 
stock to GDP ratio above 70 percent in 2006 (Figure 3).  However, the FDI inflows have 
been concentrated on only a few sectors, notably energy and telecommunications, and 
foreign investment into agriculture and manufacturing has been relatively low. The 
challenge, hence, is to attract more FDI into goods production. 
 
Figure 3:  FDI inflows remain strong 
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Source: IMF.  
 
There are some encouraging signs, though, as some of the recent FDI has stimulated 
the emergence of cross-country networks of suppliers. Over the past two decades, 
such networks have been established in the car industry in Eastern Europe and in 
electronics in East Asia, and have significantly contributed to the international economic 
success of these regions.  The systems of interrelated suppliers take advantage of inter-
country wage differentials within the region, short transport distances, and economies of 
scale from specialization (Haddad, 2007).  In Tunisia, the increased participation in EU 
automobile production networks has led to double-digit growth rates of exports of engineering 
and electrical components and a doubling of the share of mechanical and electrical engineering 
products in total exports from 9.5 percent in 1995 to 19 percent in 2006. Exports of parts and 
components, which can be seen as a proxy for exchanges in production networks, has 
expanded more dynamically in Tunisia than in other Mena countries (Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Exports of parts and components have increased dynamically 
(Share of parts and components exports in total exports) 
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Source: World Bank (2008b). 
On the other hand, among import-competing firms there remains a wide-spread 
perception of discrimination and of a skewed operating environment. In particular, 
access to land, including agricultural land, remains difficult, and firms that sell into the 
domestic market often complain about stringent restrictions to worker dismissal, anti-
competitive practices and the unfair advantages of informal competitors that do not pay 
tax and social security contributions. In a recent Enterprise Survey, about 60 percent of 
firms operating in the domestic market denounced anti-competitive practices such as 
implicit agreements, discrimination among clients and linked sales (IEQ 2006). While 
Tunisia’s competition laws seem in line with international standards, implementation 
issues remain. Moreover, the ongoing institutional dualism between the export-oriented 
offshore and import-competing onshore sectors generates numerous administrative and 
regulatory inegalities that contribute to the reluctance of domestic firms to engage in 
investment. 
There are a number of sector-specific regulations that are a hindrance to investment 
and export growth.  A recent microeconomic study of several key export sectors 
highlighted the adverse impacts of elaborate production and investment regulations 
(LINPICO, 2008). The market for olive oil, for example, is controlled by the Office 
National de l’Huile (ONH), which maintains a marketing monopoly. Prohibitions of olive 
oil imports make blending impossible, administered prices impede enterpreneurial 
activity, and mandatory quality controls through ONH add to production costs.  As a 
result, private investment to upgrade the downstream sector has been discouraged and 
about 95 percent of olive-product exports occur in raw form. In a similar vain, the 
dominant position of the Centre National d’Informatique, onerous procurement practices, 
and late payment on government contracts have made it difficult for small and medium-
sized IT firms to establish a record of reference projects that makes it possible for them to 
acquire foreign clients and export their services. 
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The government is aware of the complexities and distortions of its incentive and 
regulatory regime and, as exposure of domestic firms to EU imports has grown, has, 
for example, gradually reduced the differences between the offshore and onshore 
sectors.  Tariffs on raw materials, equipment and capital goods were reduced or 
eliminated, the use of export promotion tools and funding was extended to onshore firms, 
the onshore corporate tax was reduced from 35 to 30 percent, the top-VAT rate was 
suppressed and the remaining rates re-aligned, and VAT reimbursement rates were 
increased to 100 percent. In parallel, offshore firms were allowed to sell up to 30 percent 
of their production in the domestic market when complying with the onshore fiscal 
regime on that proportion.  Moreover, the recent law on economic initiative, promulgated 
in December 2007, is intended to foster a more investment-friendly business environment 
by simplifying administrative procedures, facilitating financing, and reducing the tax 
burden. These measures complement initiatives in tax administration aimed at improving 
the quality of services for taxpayers. 
Border procedures and taxes are also undergoing reform. Customs formalities are 
being comprehensively streamlined, with the objective of reducing the total holding 
period for merchandise from 9 days in 2006 to 3 days in 2009. The tariff regime is 
similarly being simplified.  The number of tariff bands was reduced stepwise from 54 in 
2003 to 9 in 2008. Over the same time period, the simple average of most favored nation 
tariff rates was cut by more than 9 percentage points.  These efforts to shift towards a less 
complex and more open import regime are in line with developments in the region and 
world-wide. 
Yet, Tunisia’s tariff policy remains highly distortive and has arguably become even 
more so with the preferential liberalization vis-à-vis the EU.  The average import 
tariff is the highest in the Maghreb region and more than twice as high as the Mena and 
world averages (Figure 5a). Moreover, the move to free trade for industrial products with 
the EU has introduced a substantial wedge between the duties that imports from the EU 
and those from third countries are subject to (Figure 5b).  In the extreme, imports from 
third countries are liable to duties of 43 percent, while the same product could enter the 
Tunisian market from the EU duty free.   
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Figure 5:  The tariff regime remains distortive 
 a) Average MFN import duties (%), 2007  b) Evolution of EU-preferential and MFN tariffs (%) 
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Note: Averages calculated as simple mean of tariff lines at the HS 6-digit level. Calculations include 
customs duties and surcharges 
Source: International Monetary Fund, and national authorities.  
 
The large preferential margin granted to EU exporters provides strong incentives 
for trade diversion, as well as for illicit activities.  With high external trade barriers, 
there is a risk that trade is diverted from low-cost third country producers (e.g. Indian 
suppliers of pharmaceutical generika) to high cost EU producers (e.g. European suppliers 
of branded pharmaceuticals).  The tariff wedge is also susceptible to foster smuggling and 
fraud related to certificates of origin.  In order to avoid or contain the ensuing fiscal and 
economic losses, the process of reducing MFN tariffs should continue and be re-enforced 
with the aim of providing economic operators with a viable choice of domestic or foreign 
suppliers based on product price and quality rather than on considerations of particular 
customs regimes. 
Fiscal constraints should not represent a major obstacle for further tariff reform, 
due to the limited importance of trade taxes for government finances.  The share of 
import duty revenues in total tax revenues has fallen from more than 20 percent in 1997 
to less than 10 percent since 2005 (Figure 6).  In fact, because of preferential agreements, 
duty exemptions, and investment incentives, the implied average tariff from customs 
collections is at about 2.7 percent of import value (data for 2007) significantly below the 
average listed rate.  Hence, the fiscal risks from further tariff reform seem manageable.  
Indeed, lowering MFN duties might generate additional revenues by triggering increased 
imports from third countries to replace duty-free shipments from the EU. 
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Figure 6: Tariff revenues have lost in importance 
(in percent) 
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
3. EFFICIENT BACKBONE SERVICES ARE KEY FOR SUCCESS 
Of great importance in today’s globalized economy is that domestic firms have 
access to efficiently produced backbone services inputs. Firms that have to pay more 
than their competitors for energy, telecommunications, transport and logistics, finance 
and security will find it hard to compete in both the domestic and overseas markets.  
Export diversification into products of higher quality will tend to increase the importance 
of activities that require the more intensive use of these backbone services than 
traditional activities. Moreover, the globally rapidly expanding exports of services rely 
heavily on the use of other services as inputs.  
For a country like Tunisia whose competitiveness is closely linked to its proximity to 
its main export market, i.e. Europe, efficient transport logistics are of paramount 
importance. In fact, Tunisia scores quite well with respect to several transport and trade 
facilitation dimensions of the newly developed Logistics Performance Index (World 
Bank, 2007b), which is based on a world-wide survey of global freight forwarders and 
express carriers.  The country is perceived as having the best transport and trade logistics 
in the Maghreb region, is not very far behind the much richer Mena countries of the Gulf 
peninsula, and scores better than the world-wide average of countries in its per capita 
income range.  However, Tunisia’s logistics performance falls substantially short of that 
in countries that are the best in its income range, such as China, Malaysia, and South 
Africa (Figure 7).  Several of these ―frontier‖ countries are direct competitors in major 
export markets, so that the gap in logistics performance constitutes an important 
disadvantage that merits policy makers attention. 
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Competition in the textile and clothing industry has already substantially intensified 
since the end of the quotas under the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  Labor costs in 
Tunisia are lower than those of some Eastern European countries and Turkey, but 
significantly higher than those of their Asian competitors. Hence, the future of the clothing 
sector in Tunisia depends on its exporters’ ability to better exploit the locational advantages 
vis-à-vis the European Union (World Bank, 2006). Proximity allows buyers and suppliers to 
build strong relationships and permits a better understanding of customer preferences. Firms 
can be competitive in exporting time-sensitive, replenishable products to the European 
market because their inventory costs and risks are lower than those of distant suppliers. They 
can exploit focus on products that must be replenished quickly during the selling season. 
Reducing lead time—the time required from receipt of an order to shipment to markets—is 
therefore a key priority to resist competitive pressures from Asian clothing suppliers. 
Figure 7:  Tunisia scores well on logistics, but remains far from the frontier 
(Logistics Performance Index, higher is better) 
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Source: World Bank (2007b).  
Moreover, to realize the growth objectives of the 11
th
 development plan, exports will 
likely have to grow by 12-15 percent annually, which might lead to the emergence of 
serious bottlenecks in trade and transport infrastructure.  A recent study highlighted 
the absence of a deepwater port, the lack of warehousing space and logistics platforms, 
the fragmentation of road transport services, and the weak state of professional education 
and training in logistics as major constraints to export-led development (Newton-Vaureal 
Consulting and COFINTER, 2007).  The regulatory framework might also need to be 
developped with the aim of facilitating and encouraging the implantation of foreign 
logistics services providers in Tunisia.  The recent success of Morocco in attracting large-
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scale industrial investments based on major new infrastructure developments illustrates 
the importance of efficient logistics operations for the location decisions of multinational 
firms and export growth. 
More generally, greater openness of backbone services to trade and investment could 
invigorate the Tunisian economy, as the experience of some segments of the telecom 
sector (mobile) has shown. Tunisia has undertaken a gradual opening of backbone services 
sectors to competition among private and public service providers, but many entry barriers still 
hinder activities of foreigners.  Up to now, the country has no free trade agreement that covers 
services. Multilateral liberalization of services under WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in 
Services has been very limited with only three sectors (tourism, telecom and financial sectors) 
included in the GATS Uruguay Round schedules. This coverage compares poorly with other 
countries in the region (Figure 8). While some of the services sectors not included are quite 
open (e.g. maritime transport), entry into many others is restricted. For instance, all trading 
activities, including wholesale distribution and retail trading services, are reserved for 
enterprises in which Tunisians hold a majority interest. For several other services activities, 
foreign investment requires the prior agreement of the Commission Supérieure des 
Investissements (CSI – Investment Commission) if the foreign participation exceeds 50 percent 
of the company capital (e.g. in insurance). Finally, the measures affecting the presence of 
natural persons (mode 4) remain unbound, with the exception of wholly exporting enterprises 
that can recruit up to four executives and managers of foreign nationality. 
Figure 8:  Tunisia has engaged in few GATS liberalization commitments 
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Source: World Bank (2008b).  
 
Tunisia is well positioned to benefit from dynamic developments in trade of 
professional and ICT-enabled services.  In particular, the country’s geographical and 
cultural proximity to Europe, its established commercial ties, and its strong French-speaking 
communities make it the destination of choice for ―near-shoring‖ by French and other 
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francophone companies.  The outsourcing of back-office and information technology functions 
in order to take advantage of advanced skills and lower labor costs is not as prevalent yet in 
francophone Europe as in anglophone countries, so that ample room for catch-up growth in the 
demand for these specialized services exists (Figure 9).  But taking full advantage of these 
emerging opportunities requires a strategic approach that establishes an internationally oriented 
regulatory framework for the professions, continues to upgrade and expand specialized 
training, and encourage structural consolidation of service providers to gain economies of scale. 
Figure 9: Tunisia is well placed to benefit from catch-up growth in outsourcing  
        (Call center seats per 1000 inhabitants)   (Call center seats serving francophone clients) 
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Source: Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2006. 
Nationality requirements have a particularly negative impact on medical tourism. A good 
international reputation is key for success, so that attracting blue chip reference investors from 
abroad is of substantial importance for the development of the sector. Restrictive regulations on 
the establishment of foreign medical providers (with the exception of more lenient rules for off-
shore clinics and medical training) are in this context counterproductive to the stated objective 
of FDI promotion.  In other areas, Tunisia’s regulatory framework for the medical profession 
does not appear to pose particular impediments to medical tourism, even though a review of 
existing rules to adjust them to the needs of medical services trade seems warranted.. 
The ongoing bilateral negotiations with the EU on services in the context of the Euro-Med 
Agreement have considerable potential.  They offer the opportunity for Tunisia to secure 
better market access for its services providers to Europe.  In particular, a relaxation of 
restrictions in obtaining visas and mutual recognition agreements for diplomas and professional 
qualifications with some EU countries would be of major interest for Tunisian services 
exporters. 
4. TRADE SUPPORT INSTITUTIONS CAN PLAY A USEFUL ROLE 
Both market and government failures tend to afflict developing countries as they seek to 
expand exports and growth.  Laissez faire policies are often not sufficient to prompt dynamic 
export drives or overcome obstacles in other areas.  In many cases these constraints to 
competitiveness impinge more on higher quality and differentiated products and require 
specific interventions and institutions. 
Tunisia’s  past institutional approach to international integration can be summarized as 
gradual and largely preferential.  The country has signed a number of bilateral and regional 
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trade agreements and the focus has been on slowly and partially integrating with preferential 
partners.  However, progress with negotiated duty reductions has often been compromised 
through the use of non-tariff barriers, such as technical norms or restrictive rules of origin.  
Moreover, the multitude of Tunisia’s preferential agreements forms a veritable spaghetti bowl 
of intertwined relationships and overlapping associations (Figure 10), and the implementation of 
the agreements’ provisions poses an enormous administrative challenge since they have 
different implementation schedules, varying product coverage, and distinct rules of origin.  
Partly because of the high transactions costs, trade with preferential partners other than the EU 
has not been very important for Tunisia. 
Figure 10: Tunisia is at the center of a dense network of preferential agreeements 
 
Note:  Only major agreements are depicted.   
Source: World Bank (2008b). 
Pro-active export policies have rested on several pillars in Tunisia.  In addition to the 
geographically neutral offshore regime, the government created several spatially confined 
special economic zones since the early 1990s, notably the ones in Bizerte and Zarzis.  Similar 
to offshore producers, firms in the special zones are entitled to a number of incentives, such as 
an exemption of taxes on profits or incomes, a suspension of the VAT on local purchases, an 
exemption of reinvested profits, duty-free imports of necessary raw materials and equipments, 
flexible labor contracts (―limited duration contract‖), and a One-Stop-Shop to facilitate 
administrative processes. 
Moreover, in order to help emerging exporters overcome information and other market 
failures related to penetrating new markets, the government created several trade-
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support institutions.  These include CEPEX (Centre de Promotion des Exportation), which 
provides a one-stop shop for exporters, implements the export promotion strategy under the 
Ministry of Trade, manages the computerized trade database Trade Net, and organizes training 
missions, in-country fairs, and exhibitions.  In addition, the government in collaboration with 
the World Bank in 2000 established FAMEX (Fonds d’Accès aux Marchés d’Exportations) to 
provide matching grants to emerging exporters with export potential, firms exporting new 
products, and exporters seeking to penetrate new markets. FAMEX also provides co-financing 
to professional associations such as export associations, chambers of commerce, and 
professional consulting organizations in order to make it possible for these entities to support 
groups of Tunisian firms in the development of their export programs. 
Government assistance in the area of export financing is available through the World 
Bank sponsored Pre-Shipment Finance Guarantee (PEFG) program. PEFG seeks to 
encourage financial institutions to provide pre-shipment working capital financing to emerging 
exporters with viable export contracts by bearing a part of the nonperformance risk. It thereby 
aims to alleviate the asymmetry of information between banks and exporters regarding ability 
of the latter to execute export orders according to buyers’ standards of quality, cost, and 
delivery.  PEFG got off to a good start, but the performance of the facility deteriorated 
markedly following a change in management six months after its launch (Alavi 2007).  The 
coverage and outreach of PEFG declined and banks lost confidence in the facility. Many banks 
reverted back to ex ante evaluation of nonperformance risks, which not only delayed the 
financing process, but also increased administrative costs and substantially reduced outreach to 
emerging exporters.  The disappointing experience highlights the importance of strong and 
credible management for institutions that aim to be catalysts for export growth. 
Experiences in Latin America suggest that attention to program incentives and 
networking effects is crucial for success of export promotion efforts.  For example, 
Macario (2000) identified policies that determined successes and failures in Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, and Mexico. On the basis of interviews with successful exporters, she sets out 
a set of recommendations for export promotion agencies:  they should be directed at firms 
with new products or who are entering new markets; they should emphasize cost-sharing 
to ensure that programs are used only by those truly dedicated to export; support should 
be given for a maximum of 2-3 years so that it does not turn into a subsidy; programs 
should be submitted to external evaluation; and agencies work best when they are subject 
to a mix of public and private management. More recently, Alvarez (2004) provided 
evidence from a survey of 295 small-and-medium-sized sporadic and permanent 
exporters in Chile on what type of program, institutional set-up, and financing is more 
likely to succeed. While trade shows and trade missions did not affect the probability of 
being a successful exporter, a program of exporter committees turned out to have positive 
and significant impacts. These committees were composed of groups of firms with 
common objectives in international business, which cooperate on research, marketing and 
promotion. 
5. MAKING GLOBAL INTEGRATION WORK FOR TUNISIA 
The earlier discussion highlighted a number of issues that ought to be addressed in 
order to make better use of Tunisia’s export potential.  A corresponding set of policy 
reform priorities that warrants the attention of policy makers is listed below: 
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 Reduce MFN tariffs to limit adverse effects from trade diversion and the growth 
of parallel markets. 
 Strengthen the competition authorities and the implementation of pro-competitive 
regulations. 
 Continue the process of aligning offshore and onshore regulations, including with 
respect to administrative aspects. 
 Review investment restrictions in services sectors, with a view to facilitate the 
participation of foreign investors. 
 Encourage investment in modern warehouses and logistics platforms, and develop 
specialized logistics education and training programs. 
 Pursue the planned development of a new deep water port, and streamline trade 
procedures in the ports in cooperation with private sector operators. 
 Consider alleviating the nationality requirement for entry into the medical, 
accounting, legal, and engineering professions. 
 Develop a services exports strategy and improve surveyance of services sector 
activities and trade, including by strengthening the statistical apparatus. 
 Improve services coverage in (future) trade agreements, and harmonize provisions 
in free trade agreements. 
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